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ABSTRACT
Measuring market discrimination is extremely difficult except in the increasingly rare case where
physical output measures allow direct measurement of productivity. We illustrate this point with
evidence on elections to offices of the American Economic Association. Using a new technique to
infer the determinants of the chances of observing a particular outcome when there are K choices
out of N possibilities, we find that female candidates have a much better than random chance of
victory. This advantage can be interpreted either as reverse discrimination or as reflecting voters'
beliefs that women are more productive than observationally identical men in this activity. If the
former this finding could be explained by the behavior of an unchanging median voter whose gender
preferences were not satisfied by the suppliers of candidates for office; but there was a clear
structural change in voting behavior in the mid-1970s. The results suggest that it is not generally
possible to claim that differences in rewards for different groups measure the extent of
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  Nearly 50 years ago Gary Becker (1957) set out the definition of discrimination used by economists 
today:  A premium required to work with, buy from or employ a member of the group one discriminates 
against when that person is, except for group membership, identical to other individuals who are not 
discriminated against.  The supply of members of that group and the distribution of preferences among the 
majority generate the observed outcome of market discrimination.  This concept has proven incredibly 
powerful and has generated an immense empirical literature designed to measure the extent of market 
discrimination (see, e.g., Blau and Kahn, 2000, on gender discrimination). 
  The difficulty with the implementation of this concept is that it requires the econometrician who 
attempts to measure market discrimination to be sure that the members of the group experiencing 
discrimination are identical in all relevant ways to members of the majority.  In the case of discrimination in 
economic rewards in a world where the relevant output is physical and easily measured (perhaps sports—see 
Kahn, 1991) this may be possible; but in most activities in industrialized societies the output is not physical, 
and it is impossible to adjust fully for differences in the productivity of members of the minority and 
majority.  This argument does not mean that there is no value in comparing rewards after adjusting for as 
many factors as we can observe.  It simply suggests that the measure of discrimination need not reflect 
underlying tastes—the original concept of discrimination—but may instead reflect a mixture of tastes and 
unobservable differences in productivity. 
  We illustrate this proposition with a particularly stark example of apparent gender discrimination—
the election of officers of the American Economic Association.  We examine the determinants of the 
outcomes of the 92 contested elections that occurred from 1959 through 2004, relating them to the 
candidates’ ascriptive characteristics and one measure that arguably indicates the candidates’ productivity.  
The results suggest the difficulty of identifying not only the extent of discrimination, but also its causes and 
even its direction.   2
II.  Data and Institutions 
  Beginning with the officers whose terms started in 1935, the American Economic Association has 
sent its members slates of four nominees for each of two positions as vice-president, and four nominees for 
each of two positions on the Executive Committee.
1  Those elected have some (consultative) decision-
making power over the affairs of the Association and hold offices that many might view as prestigious.  
Each Association member receives a ballot in the fall before the year that the candidates would take office 
(Year t) and can vote for up to two candidates for each of these positions.  Lists of candidates and winners of 
these four-person elections beginning with 1935 form the data set used here.  Because of difficulties in 
obtaining some of the measures (and the impossibility of obtaining information on our productivity measure 
for elections for office before 1959), the formal analysis concentrates on elections beginning with that year, 
although we also present some information for the 1935-1958 elections. 
  The outcome is winning or losing an election.  As identifiers of the candidates’ characteristics we 
include:  1) Gender—whether the candidate is female or male.  2) Honorable—whether the candidate held or 
holds a position in government that carries with it the honorific “honorable.”  We include this measure to 
examine whether the publicity attached to such positions, or perhaps the recognition that they convey of the 
candidate’s competence, affects his/her electoral chances.  3) Affiliation.  This includes measures of whether 
the candidate is affiliated with a “Top 5” institution (Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Chicago or Stanford), and 
whether he/she is not an academic.  4) Race—whether or not the candidate is an African-American.  5) 
Field—whether or not the candidate is a theorist or econometrician.  This distinction is clearly 
impressionistic, so that any results on this measure must be interpreted carefully.  6) Distinction—whether 
the candidate is a future Nobel Prize winner.  This measure is less relevant for elections during the last 
decade of our sample, given the likely lags between recognition by the local (American) profession and by 
the Swedish Nobel Committee.  All but the last of these characteristics have been readily available to the 
                                                 
1Until the late 1930s the position of President of the Association was also contested.  Since no women were nominated 
for that office during those years, we ignore elections for President.  
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voters, as the Association has been enclosing an information sheet with a brief vita along with the ballot, and 
has even included pictures since at least the early 1970s. 
We base the measure of scholarly productivity on the number of citations each candidate has 
received to his/her work.  Among candidates for office in the elections from 1968-2004 we found citations 
in Year t-2 (the most recent complete calendar year in which impressions on the voters could have been 
made).  For the elections for office 1959-1967 we sum citations in Years t-4, t-3 and t-2.
2  In all cases we 
calculate the candidate’s share of citations among the nominees for the particular offices. Thus if all 
candidates in a four-person election were identical along this dimension, each would obtain a value of 0.25 
for this measure. 
III.  An Initial Look at Outcomes 
  While the ascriptive measures that we use are not orthogonal to each other, and while each may be 
correlated with our productivity measure, it is nonetheless interesting to examine how candidates’ 
unconditional chances of electoral victory differ by their characteristics.  The upper part of Table 1 presents 
statistics—the means and their associated standard errors—describing the shares of candidates with each 
characteristic, their success probability, and the average share of citations within each category.  The most 
striking feature is that for all but the first two characteristics listed the success probability does not differ 
significantly from 0.50.  There is no evidence from the mean outcomes that being at a “Top 5” institution, 
being outside academe, being African-American, being a theorist or econometrician or being a future Nobel 
Prize winner has a significant effect on the likelihood of victory in these elections. 
Only two characteristics—gender, and having held or currently holding a high-level government 
position—have significant impacts on the likelihood of winning.  70 percent of “honorable” candidates are 
elected, significantly different from 50 percent (t = 2.84, p<.05).  74 percent of female candidates emerged 
victorious from their elections, also significantly different from 50 percent (t = 3.68, p<.01).  It is worth 
                                                 
2Using several years’ citations in the early years of the sample is necessary to reduce the sampling error resulting from 
the relative paucity of journals catalogued in those years.  The citation counts are from the on-line Social Science 
Citation Index and include all self-citations and citations to the author regardless of his/her order in the authorship.  
This database has citations for individual years beginning only with 1955. 
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noting that the average female candidate and the average “honorable” candidate have far below the average 
fraction of citations, 0.25, in any given election.  
  The bottom part of Table 1 answers the question whether scholarly productivity—really scholarly 
impact—matters in these elections.  It clearly does:  Each successively lower quartile of candidates by 
citation share has a successively lower probability of electoral victory.  Moreover, the probabilities are 
nearly symmetric around 0.50:  The chance that a candidate in the top quartile of citation shares wins an 
election differs from 50 percent by about the same (statistically significant) amount as does that of a 
candidate in the bottom quartile, and similarly for candidates in the second and third quartiles of the 
distribution of the shares of citations. 
IV.  Estimating a Model of the Determinants of Electoral Success 
  A.  A Feel for the Multivariate Relationships 
  The standard approach to studying the binary outcome, electoral victory, is to estimate something 
like a probit or a logit.  For reference purposes, in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 we present the results of 
estimating two probits.  The estimates corroborate and even strengthen the inferences from the descriptive 
statistics presented in Table 1.  A candidate’s share of citations has a significant positive effect on his/her 
electoral chances, as do gender and having held or currently holding a high-level government position.  
Moreover, the implied t-statistics on the coefficients of the variables Female and Honorable are far larger 
than the t-statistics testing the hypotheses that their raw means differ from 0.50. This is not surprising, given 
that the share of citations raises the probability of election and is less than 0.25 in each of these groups.  
These three measures alone produce significant effects on the probability of election. In line with inferences 
from the descriptive statistics, none of the other five variables significantly affects electoral probabilities, 
although theorists and econometricians apparently do suffer some electoral disadvantage, while faculty at 
Top 5 institutions do reap some additional advantage. 
    5
B.  Inferring the Impacts on Electoral Chances—A Multinomial Multiple-Response Estimator
3  
  The estimates presented in the previous Subsection may be informative, but they are incorrect.  
Given the institutional arrangements governing the elections, the probabilities that each candidate will be 
elected must sum to two in each of the ninety-two four-person elections.  While the probit correctly 
constrains each individual candidate’s chances of being elected to be on the open unit interval, it cannot 
impose this more basic institutional restriction.  The econometric problem—estimating the determinants of a 
multiple of positives from among a fixed set of choices—does not appear to have addressed before (although 
a somewhat related econometric issue was modeled by Bloom and Cavanaugh, 1986). 
  Let the underlying desirability of candidate j in election i be: 
(1)   y
*
ji = xjiβ + εji . 
Within each four-person election there are 4C2 = 6 possible sets of winners.  (Since we do not see the votes, 
but only the identities of the winners and losers, the problem is one of combinations, not permutations.)  Let 
the indicator for the pair of candidates that won the election be zi{j, l} for j ≠ l, where zi{j, l} = zi{l, j}.  Then 
the contribution of election i to the likelihood function is: 
                      4       4 
(2)  Li  = ∏ ∏ P(zi{j, l} = 1│x)
zi{j, l} , 
          j=1 l>j 
 
where: 
                       4     4 
            ∑ ∑ zi{j, l} = 1 
          j=1 l>j 
The issue is one of calculating the probabilities P(zi{j, l} = 1│x).  Assume that the εji are 
independent random variables. Arbitrarily ordering the observations so that candidates 1 and 2 win the four-
person election, for a general distribution of the error terms: 
(3) P(zi{1,2} = 1│x) = P(y
*
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3We use this term based on Wooldridge’s (2002) usage for the standard case where only one of out N possible choices 
can be made.    6
where  y
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4i}.  Noting that probabilities can be written as expectations of indicator functions 
(1(·)), and substituting from (1), we can rewrite (3) as: 
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where H is the cumulative distribution function of εji. The particular estimator depends on the assumptions 
made about the nature of the distribution of the εji. 
The technique we have developed here to model multinomial multiple responses would appear 
applicable to elections in which there are more than one winner and more candidates than winners.
4  Indeed, 
the general technique is applicable to estimating the determinants of responses in any case in which there are 
a fixed number K >1 of slots that must be filled from among a fixed number N>K of choices.  This would 
include admissions to many educational institutions (e.g., the U.S. military academies, many medical 
schools), some scholarship competitions, quinella bets on horse races, and the three medals awarded among 
the eight finalists in many Olympic track and swimming events. 
  We assume that the errors εji in (1) are independent N(0,1), generating a probit-type estimator. The 
specific form is derived in the Appendix, along with that for a logit-type estimator.
5  The results of 
estimating the determinants of the electoral outcomes are presented in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.  They 
are qualitatively like those using the incorrect simple probits—the impacts of each independent variable on 
the desirability index, y
*
ji, do not change much compared to the similar specifications in Columns (1) and 
(2).  The standard errors, however, are somewhat larger, and some of the coefficients that had approached 
statistical significance (e.g., Top 5 School) no longer do.  With this correct estimation procedure again only 
                                                 
4There is a substantial literature on elections in multimember electoral districts.  The theoretical literature has examined 
voting patterns given preferences (Gerber et al, 1998), while the empirical literature has focused on characteristics of 
winners without formally examining the elections’ determinants (e.g., Niemi et al, 1985). 
 
5The maximum-likelihood estimates under the assumptions about the error terms that generate this estimator are 
qualitatively the same as those for the probit-type estimator. 
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the three variables, share of citations, Female and Honorable, significantly increase a candidate’s electoral 
chances.
6 
V.  A Focus on Gender Discrimination   
  The means in Table 1 and the estimates in Table 2 show a clear electoral advantage to female 
candidates.  The inference about women’s advantage in these elections is similar to that found by 
Dillingham et al (1994) for election to office in a much smaller association of economists.  Female voters in 
that group had a nearly lexicographic preference for female candidates, while male voters slightly preferred 
female candidates but were easily swayed by candidates’ other measurable qualifications.  In elections to 
confer an honorific in another association of economists, however, female candidates were treated 
identically to males with objectively identical qualifications (Hamermesh and Schmidt, 2003).   These 
results make it worth delving further into the treatment of female candidates, as it can illuminate issues of 
discrimination/favoritism more generally. 
  What might constitute gender discrimination in this case?  One might argue that, conditional on 
being on the ballot, disparate electoral chances of otherwise identical candidates, of the sort that we observe 
above, indicate the presence of disparate treatment by the electorate.  If one assumes that the set of potential 
winners is the entire Association, then gender discrimination might be implied by differential representation 
among the winners by gender compared to the Association, conditioning on gender differences in the 
“productivity” of the profession’s members.  While we cannot impose this latter condition, below we do 
examine how levels and changes in the supply of candidates and winners by gender relate to the gender mix 
of the profession. 
                                                 
6One possible omission is the simultaneous presence of candidates from the same institution, which describes 7 percent 
of the sample.  An indicator for this occurrence had a negative, albeit not quite statistically significant effect, on the 
probability of electoral victory.  Its impacts on the estimated coefficients in Column (3) were tiny, raising each slightly 
and slightly lowering their standard errors.  A measure of the candidates’ years since the Ph.D. degree was quite 
insignificant statistically (and negative) and had a tiny influence on the other coefficients; similarly insignificant results 
were obtained for an indicator of whether the candidate had previously received the John Bates Clark Medal.   8
A.  Unobservable Characteristics 
One might be tempted to argue that the results demonstrate that women are the benefactors of 
reverse discrimination by the Association’s electorate.  That would be true if academic impact, as captured 
by the share of citations among the four candidates in any given election, were monotonically related to 
productivity in office and were uncorrelated with other productivity-increasing characteristics.  There is no 
reason to infer that this is true.  One can readily adduce other qualifications, such as organizational ability, 
willingness to accomplish tasks on time, and ability to interact productively with colleagues in reaching 
decisions, that might be possessed in greater amounts by female candidates and confer an advantage on them 
in the eyes of the voters.  Psychological research shows that women score higher in personality inventories 
on such characteristics as Restraint, Friendliness and Personal Relations (Guilford et al, 1976, p. 108; 
Butcher and Pancheri, 1976, pp. 24-225). Without information on these characteristics, which cannot be 
obtained in this sample, we cannot infer whether the outcomes of these elections reflect the 
nondiscriminatory result that the most “productive” candidates win or instead indicate reverse gender 
discrimination.  This is a standard problem of unobservable productive characteristics, a problem that 
pervades the literature on discrimination (although it is infrequently acknowledged). 
B.  Inferring the Preferences of an Unchanging Median Voter 
Let us try to interpret the results under the assumption that there is an unchanging median voter 
whose preferences for the gender of candidates are unchanged over the entire sample period. To the extent 
that women have productive characteristics that appeal to that voter independent of scholarly productivity, 
so that male and female candidates are not perfect substitutes, one would expect that voter to have a 
decreasing willingness to choose a female candidate as the number of females on the ballot increases.  To 
examine this possibility we estimate a probit describing a woman’s chances of winning an election as a 
function of her scholarly quality (citation share) and the total number of women on the ballot.  The sample 
consists only of the 46 female candidates; in years when at least one woman is on the ballot the total number 
of female candidates has a minimum of 1 (and in this sample) a maximum of 3 from among the 8 candidates.    9
The mean probability that a female candidate wins if she is the only female on the ballot is 0.81; it falls to 
0.75 if there are two women on the ballot, and to 0.56 if there are three women. 
Estimated probit derivatives describing the effects of the number of female candidates on the ballot 
on a woman’s chance of victory are shown in the first column of Table 3.  They suggest that the median 
voter’s willingness to vote for a female candidate diminishes as the number of women on the ballot 
increases, with the estimate being nearly statistically significant at conventional levels despite the small 
sample size.  Moreover, the decline in women’s electoral success as more women are added to the ballot is 
not the definitional result of the presence of more women competing for the same two positions:  When we 
substitute the number of women competing for the other office in place of the total number of women, the 
results, shown in the second column of the Table, are essentially unchanged.  Voters appear to pay attention 
to the number of women on the ballot, although the impact is not highly significant. 
This apparent eventual satiation with female candidates is unique to that group.  In the remaining 
columns of Table 3 we present estimates of similar probits over samples of Honorable candidates, academics 
at Top 5 Schools, nonacademics and theorists/econometricians.
7  The number of other candidates on the 
ballot who have the same characteristic as a particular candidate matters to the voter, if at all, only in the 
case of female candidates.
8 
  Let us model the apparent attention that voters pay to the number of females on the ballot.  Consider 
the median voter, whose CES preferences are defined (as is implicit in the results in Table 3) as a function of 
the candidates’ gender and their scholarly productivity: 
(5) U  =  {α[M·G(CM) ]




where M and F are the number of male and female candidates, α is the preference parameter for otherwise 
identical male and female candidates, ρ = 1 – 1/σ, where σ is the median voter’s substitution elasticity 
                                                 
7We do not show results for African-Americans, since in no year was more than one African-American on the ballot. 
  
8Only those observations are included in which fewer than three of the four candidates had the particular characteristic, 
so that each observation in these samples could conceivably have won the election.  This restriction is binding only for 
the category Top 5 School. 
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between male and female candidates, and G is some increasing function of the candidate’s share of citations.  
Letting M ≡ 8 – F and G(CM) = G(1-CF), the median voter’s marginal rate of substitution between male and 
female candidates is: 
(6) MRSMF  = [α/[1- α]] · {[F/M]
 G*(CF)}
1-ρ  
where G* is an increasing function of CF.  The willingness of the median voter to substitute female for male 
candidates is a decreasing function of the median voter’s inherent preference for males and an increasing 
function of the female candidates’ average share of citations. 
  The supply of candidates to the voters is not competitive.  Instead, the AEA Nominating Committee 
(a rotating group designated by the current President of the Association) chooses candidates.  Assuming 
rationality on the part of the Committee, we model its choices of candidates as if it makes forecasts of their 
probabilities of victory, so that it implicitly sets those probabilities, pF and pM, for female and male 
candidates in each election.  As the estimates of the probits in the first columns of Table 3 show, these 
probabilities depend on the number of female candidates, so we can write them as: 
 p F = pF(F) and pM = pM(8-F) . 
The median voter sets his/her marginal rate of substitution between the male and female candidates equal to 
this implicit price ratio, yielding: 
(7)   pF(F)/pM(8-F) =  [α/[1- α]] ·{F
 G*(CF)/[8-F]}
1-ρ  .  
Setting the relative quality (measured by C) of female and male candidates equal (implicit in the estimates in 
Table 3), so that G*(CF) ≡ 1, and taking logarithms yields: 
(8) ln[pF(F)/pM(8-F)] = ln(α/[1- α]) – [1/σ]ln([F/8-F]) . 
 
  We can treat this as an estimating equation, albeit one on which there are useful observations on F 
ranging only from 1 through 3.  Thus merely as an exercise (with this tiny sample) we can estimate equation 
(8) over these three values using the implied pF and pM calculated from the estimates in the first column of 
Table 3.  This exercise yields an adjusted R
2 = 0.55 (p=.32) and estimates of α= 0.57 and σ = 4.27.  The 
estimates are sensible economically, but not at all statistically meaningful.   11
These results suggest that, if there were a median voter whose views on the gender of candidates 
were unchanging over the entire period, that voter would view males and females as highly substitutable and 
would prefer to have a nearly 50-50 split of winning candidates.  Under the assumption of an unchanging 
median voter they also indicate that it is unsurprising that women’s electoral chances are so high:  That 
hypothetical voter’s welfare would be maximized if he/she could elect candidates, roughly half of whom 
were women.  Taking this view one might infer that Nominating Committees have supplied too few female 
candidates for these offices to satisfy the voters’ preferences. 
C.  Is There an Unchanging Median Voter Along the Dimension of Gender? 
   To examine whether our assumption of an unchanging median voter makes sense, consider first 
whether female candidates’ electoral chances have changed over time.  Figure 1 decomposes the sample 
period from Table 1 into sub-periods of eight to ten years and also includes two earlier sub-periods, 1935-
1948 and 1949-1958, for comparison purposes.  The graph shows the fraction of females among all 
candidates and among winners.  The coincidence of the fractions of female nominees and winners before the 
mid-1970s shows that a female candidate’s chances of winning an election in the Association were 
remarkably close to those of a male candidate.  Since the mid-1970s female candidates have had a decided 
electoral advantage, the results of which are apparent in the overall means for 1959-2004 in Table 1. 
  To examine further the possibility of a structural break we re-estimated the multinomial multiple-
response model shown in Column (3) of Table 2 over each of a large number of pairs of sub-periods, 
beginning with the pair 1959-1966, 1967-2004, and ending with the pair 1959-1996, 1997-2004.   
Likelihood-ratio tests make it absolutely clear that a structural change took place at some point in the early 
to mid-1970s, with the highest (and statistically significant) likelihood ratio being for a structural break 
between 1974 and 1975.  Before the mid-1970s women’s chances of being elected, given their other 
objective characteristics, did not differ from those of men; thereafter women had a huge electoral advantage.  
The median voter’s views on gender do not appear to have been constant over this entire period.  Before the 
mid-1970s the median voter seemed indifferent to gender; thereafter he/she preferred women at the margin 
(of the supply of candidates).   12
What might have caused this change? One possibility is that the identity of the median voter 
changed toward someone who is more likely to favor female candidates, perhaps a female voter. Since we 
cannot observe individual ballots, we cannot be certain about the gender of voters in this Association; but we 
can use published information from the Association’s Directories or Handbooks to infer the share of women 
in the potential electorate, the AEA membership.  Taking all of the available issues beginning in 1936, we 
sampled members’ names randomly and in each case tried to infer from their first names whether they were 
men or women. While it is not always possible to make these inferences correctly, so that measurement error 
is added to sampling error, there is no reason to believe that the estimates are biased down. 
The first column of Table 4 presents our best estimates of the representation of women in the 
Association’s membership.  Even today, women account for no more than one-sixth of AEA members.
9  The 
growth in female representation since the 1960s (which occurred exclusively in the 1970s and 1980s) may 
mean that the gender identity of the median voter, and thus perhaps his/her preferences, changed over this 
period.
10 
The fractions female before and after the structural break did not differ that greatly—rising from 
perhaps 8 percent to perhaps 13 percent.  Could this small increase have made such a huge difference?  
Voter turnout in these elections is not large, as the data in Column (4) of Table 4 show—by the 1970s 
turnout was 30 percent.  Even if nobody’s preferences changed, the small increase in female representation 
in the membership coupled with the low turnout could have combined to alter substantially the preferences 
of the median voter because his/her identity changed. 
                                                 
9We conducted similar tabulations for earlier decades.  Counts show that the share of women in the Association in 1894 
was 4.55 percent, and in 1906 was 3.55 percent, while samples indicate that in 1910 the share was 4.05 percent, in 
1919, 3.33 percent, and in 1928, 4.51 percent.  Since in each of the last three cases the standard error was about 1 
percent, we may infer that the association’s membership was roughly 4 percent female from its inception through the 
first third of the 20
th century.  
 
10The data provide an interesting perspective on how World War II changed the gender composition of the profession.  
While the membership of the AEA grew steadily, World War II saw a sharp rise in the fraction female (with “Edna the 
Economist” perhaps an analog to “Rosie the Riveter”).  Absent a Directory or Handbook between 1948 and 1957, we 
cannot tell whether, as Goldin (1991) showed generally, women left the profession disproportionately after the War or 
whether the old patterns of inflow reasserted themselves. 
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It is also possible that the gender of the median voter did not change, but that his preferences did.  
Male voters (who surely constituted the majority of the voters through the late 1980s) may in the 1970s 
either have begun to believe that female candidates possess unobservable productive characteristics, or they 
may perhaps have suddenly become willing to indulge in reverse discrimination.  Like the possibility that 
the median voter’s identity changed, this one too is consistent with the data. 
Regardless of the identity of the median voter, for the past thirty years the evidence shows that at the 
margin he/she has a preference for electing otherwise identical female candidates. Since 1974 women have 
accounted for only 16.2 percent of all candidates.  Indeed, even during the last ten years of the sample 
women comprised only 21.5 percent of the candidates.  Although these percentages exceed women’s 
representation in the Association’s membership, the suppliers of candidates—the Nominating Committees—
might be viewed as having supplied too few female candidates to satisfy voters’ revealed preferences to vote 
for women.  Whether or not the median voter’s preferences on gender have changed during this period, from 
this viewpoint one could interpret the evidence presented here not as reverse discrimination in favor of 
women by the electorate, but rather as discrimination against women by the suppliers of candidates for 
office in the Association—the Nominating Committees and the Association Presidents who select them.
11 
This apparent change in preferences is not a result of the changing gender mix of the suppliers of 
candidates—the Nominating Committees.  Taking the sub-periods shown in Figure 1, in 1935-1948, 1949-
1958 and 1959-1966 there was one woman (out of between five and seven people) on the Committee in 
most years of the latter two sub-periods.  In every year during the sub-periods 1967-1974 and 1975-1984 
there was exactly one woman.  Since then the number of women on the Committee has ranged from zero to 
four (out of seven or eight members).  Women have been well represented among the suppliers of 
candidates, given their representation in the Association; but their presence among the suppliers only 
                                                 
11One reader argued that lumpiness and the thinness of the distribution of qualified female candidates might have 
induced this apparent undersupply of female candidates.  This explanation is logically possible; but even restricting the 
choice set to female full professors in the top 17 public university economics departments, the Ivy League, Stanford, 
Chicago and MIT, in 2002 there were 31 women (calculated from Hasselback, 2002).  Moreover, there is no trend in 
the average citations share of female candidates.   14
affected electoral outcomes beginning in the mid-1970s, and only then did the representation of women on 
the ballot increase rapidly. 
We cannot determine the ultimate cause of the apparent electoral advantage of women in this 
association.  All the facts together, however, militate toward an interpretation that the median voter’s 
(probably a male’s) attitude toward gender in these elections changed in the early 1970s and yielded the 
apparent reverse discrimination that we now observe. 
VI.  Conclusions—Implications for Studying Discrimination 
  We have examined the determinants of victory in elections to office in the American Economic 
Association.  To measure these properly we have developed an estimator that we believe is useful in a large 
variety of other contexts.  The estimates show that, while standard measures of scholarly productivity affect 
outcomes, so does the gender of the candidate, an effect that became apparent only beginning in the mid-
1970s.  The preference for women, given their representation on the ballot, may stem from unchanging 
behavior by an unchanging median voter; the structural shift in the mid-1970s suggests, however, that it 
arose either from the small increase in female representation in the electorate or more likely from changing 
preferences among male voters. 
This examination should demonstrate that the notion of discrimination is a very slippery empirical 
issue.  While it appears superficially that these elections suggest the existence of reverse discrimination in 
favor of women, our inability to control for many characteristics that might be argued are indicators of 
productivity in the particular “job” means that reverse gender discrimination may not exist in this sample.  
Indeed, assuming that the electorate is rational and can assess the productivity of the candidates presented to 
it, the apparent demand for more female candidates than have generally been provided may mean that the 
Association has discriminated against women by failing to nominate them in numbers sufficient to satisfy 
the electorate. 
This conclusion may satisfy the priors of many observers of this Association and of labor markets 
generally.  What if, however, we had shown that women’s (or some other group’s) electoral chances were 
significantly below 50 percent and that, like female candidates in this Association, they were at least   15
proportionately represented among the nominees?  Would the analogous inference, that the suppliers of 
candidates had failed to accommodate voters’ preferences and had been nominating too many women, be as 
appealing?  Put in the context of labor markets more broadly, if we measured market discrimination against 
a minority group, an argument analogous to the one made here might reasonably point out that this outcome 
simply satisfies the tastes of the median consumer.  In sum, the results should hardly reassure anybody who 
has thought about issues of discrimination in this profession, in the electoral process or in labor markets 
more generally. 
The inability to control for productivity differences in empirical studies of possibly discriminatory 
outcomes is hardly unique to this study, to studies of electoral outcomes generally, or even to studies of 
economic outcomes.  In the end our notions of what constitutes discrimination in specific instances must be 
cognizant of the possibility that we have been unable to account for differences that may be correlated with 
the characteristic of the group that we are studying and are productive in the jobs under study.  The only 
alternatives are to concentrate on those few cases where we can be sure that we have properly adjusted for 
inter-group differences in productivity or to demonstrate in other cases that those differences are 
unimportant.  The former approach is severely limiting, while the latter approach seems highly uncertain.   16
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APPENDIX.  Specific Functional Forms for the Multinomial Multiple-Response Estimator 
  In the case where εji ~ N(0,1) we can use the symmetry of the normal distribution to specify 
equation (4) as: 
(A1) E((1-Φ(y
*
wi  -x1iβ))(1 - Φ(y
*
wi - x2iβ))│xi) = E(Φ(x1iβ - y
*
wi )(Φ(x2 iβ - y
*
w i )│xi). 
Letting candidates 1 and 2 in each election be the winners, we can write  
P(zi{1,2} = 1│x) = ∫Φ(x1iβ - y
*




wi  - x4iβ)φ(y
*
wi  - x3 iβ)dy 
  +   ∫Φ(x1iβ - y
*




wi  - x3 iβ)φ(y
*
wi  - x4 iβ)dy. 
The log-likelihood is then: 
                                 n 
(A2) log  L(β) = ∑ zi{1,2}log(P{zi{1,2} = 1│xi) . 
                               i=1 
In the case of the extreme value distribution the error term is distributed: 
  ε ~ g(ε) = exp(-ε)G(ε) , 
 G(ε) = exp(-exp(-ε)) . 
A typical expression is then: 
 exp(x3 iβ)/[exp(x1 iβ) + exp(x3 iβ) + exp(x4 iβ)] , 
and the left-hand side of (A1) reduces to: 




wi – x2iβ)) =  
[exp(x3 iβ) + exp(x4 iβ)] /[exp(x1 iβ) + exp(x2 iβ) + exp(x3 iβ) + exp(x4 iβ)]. 
We then have P(zi{1,2} = 1│x) =   
1 - [exp(x3 iβ)exp(x4 iβ)]/[exp(x1 iβ) + exp(x3 iβ) + exp(x4 iβ)]  
  - [exp(x3 iβ)exp(x4 iβ)]/[exp(x2 iβ) + exp(x3 iβ) + exp(x4 iβ)] 
  + [exp(x3 iβ) + exp(x4 iβ)]/[exp(x1 iβ) + exp(x2 iβ) + exp(x3 iβ) + exp(x4 iβ)]. 
The log-likelihood function is calculated using these expressions in (A2). Table 1.  Fractions of Candidates by Type, and Their Winning Chances and Shares of Citations, 
Contested AEA Elections 1959-2004  (N = 368) 
 
Characteristic           Share of Candidates  Win Probability  Share of Citations 
 
Female     .125      .739      .102 
          (.065)    (.011) 
 
Honorable    .125      .696      .196 
       (.069)    (.023) 
 
Top  5  School    .370      .574      .320 
       (.043)    (.016) 
   
Nonacademic    .092      .471      .151 
       (.087)    (.025) 
 
African-American   .046      .412      .087 
          (.123)    (.029) 
 
Theory/Econometrics   .209      .416      .305 
       (.057)    (.020) 
 
Future  Nobelist    .103      .605      .414 
       (.080)    (.029) 
 
Share of Citations: 
    Top  Quartile         .620      .495 
       (.051)    (.012) 
 
  2
nd  Quartile         .533      .283 
       (.052)    (.004) 
 
  3
rd  Quartile         .456      .166 
       (.052)    (.003) 
 
    Bottom  Quartile        .391      .057 
       (.051)    (.003) 
 
*Standard errors in parentheses below the means. Table 2.  Estimates of the Determinants of Electoral Victory,  
92 Contested AEA Elections 1959-2004 (N = 368) 
 
      Ordinary probit      Multinomial  
      M u l t i p l e   R e s p o n s e  
Characteristic   
 
Share of Citations     2.634     2.629          2.771     2.680             
        (.444)    (.493)       (.455)    (.546)             
 
Female       1.146     1.156          1.359     1.349             
        (.232)    (.234)       (.306)    (.322)  
 
Honorable      0.691     0.660          0.843     0.782             
        (.218)    (.228)           (.280)     (.306)                
 
Top 5 School      -------    0.170          -------     0.225    
          (.152)              (.205)     
   
Nonacademic      -------   -0.101         -------    -0.040    
          (.259)             (.307)     
   
African-American    -------    0.358           -------     0.139    
           (.343)                   (.379)           
 
Theory/Econometrics    -------   -0.315          -------    -0.332    
          (.185)                 (.272)       
 
Future Nobelist       -------    0.162            -------     0.118      
          (.250)          (.292)     
 
Constant     -0.879   -0.896        
        (.145)   (.165)         
 
Log L      -226.41  -223.74       -140.64  -138.72    
 
*Standard errors in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Table 3.  Probit Estimates of Candidates’ Winning Chances as Functions of “Crowding,” 1959-     
2004*  
 
                      Female               Honorable   Top 5  Nonacademic   Theory/         
                       Econometrics 
    
Share of citations    3.07   2.84             .484     .826         .381      1.175       
(1.13)  (1.13)            (.481)    (.275)       (.604)   (.384)     
 
Number on ballot  -.127              -.008    -.067        -.031    .044     
  (.080)               (.102)    (.050)       (.117)   (.062)     
Number in other    -.128   
   election      (.097) 
 
Number of Observations         46               46      106           34        71     
  
Pseudo-R
2    .177   .163             .019      .079         .009    .105     
 
*The estimates are of the impact of a one-unit increase in the independent variable on the probability of 
winning.  Their standard errors are in parentheses. 
 Table 4.  Estimates of AEA Female Membership, and Voter Turnout in AEA Elections, 1936-2002
a 
 
Year of   Percent       Std. Error        Sample Size        Percent Voter  
Directory  Female                    Turnout 
   
1936       5.56   0.97   558   46.52 
1938       6.36   1.07   519   53.51 
1940       6.45   1.07   527   48.82 
1942       7.93   1.03   694   21.44 
1946       9.90   1.04   818   41.16 
1948       9.38   0.99   864   42.82 
1957       8.08   1.05   668   34.86 
1964       8.16   1.08   637   36.48
 
1966       7.92   0.97   770   35.41 
1969       6.33   1.02   569   29.37 
1974       9.38   0.97   895   30.28 
1978   10.53   0.99   959   31.09
b 
1981    13.05    1.06             1019    29.22 
1985    12.79    1.04             1040    27.96 
1989    15.13    1.13             1011    23.88   
1993    15.15    1.08             1096    22.50 
1997    15.52    1.06             1173    23.23 
2002    16.08    0.60             3794    14.87 
 
aThe estimates of the percent female in the membership are based on tabulations of the first names of 
random samples of members from AEA Handbooks and Directories.  The voter turnouts are calculated from 
reports contained in various issues of American Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings. 
 
b1977.    Figure 1.  Women as Fractions of Candidates 
and Winners, AEA 1935-2004
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